This study provides the first econometric analysis on the dynamic dimension of establishment-level codetermination in Germany. We hypothesize that learning implies a change in the nature and scope of codetermination over time. Using unique data from small-and medium-sized establishments, our empirical analysis provides strong evidence that learning indeed plays a crucial role in the functioning of works councils. First, the probability of an adversarial relationship between management and works council is decreasing in the age of the council. Second, the council"s age is positively associated with the probability that the council has an influence even on decisions where it has no legal powers. Third, establishment output is increasing in the age of the council. Fourth, the quit rate is decreasing in the age of the council. However, our estimates also provide evidence of a codetermination life cycle. JEL Classification: J52, J53, K31, M54
Introduction
Works councils have attracted considerable attention as an alternative form of worker representation to improve both the quality of working life and economic performance.
They play an important role in corporate governance in many West European countries (Rogers and Streeck 1995) . Specifically German works councils have acquired extensive powers compared to councils in other countries (Thelen and Turner 1997) . Those powers have even been strengthened by the actively debated 2001 amendment of the Works Constitution Act (WCA), the law that governs the works council system. Works councils play also a role outside Europe. In Korea, mandated councils deal with productivity concerns, employee training, and health and safety issues (Kleiner and Lee 1997) . In Canada, nonunion representation has a long tradition. Mandatory health and safety committees have been introduced in several provinces (Bernard 1995) . Furthermore, committees must be set up in case of layoffs and plant closures. Canada"s mandatory committees are similar to European works councils (Adams 1985) . In the US, the interest in nonunion representation has been spurred by a sharp decline in union density and the growth of a "representation gap" (Freeman and Rogers 1999) . Much of the political discussion in the US has centered on the idea of mandating German-style works councils.
Economists have also shown strong interest in codetermination. This is documented by a remarkably increasing number of econometric studies on the consequences of German works councils. While earlier studies found rather negative economic effects, recent examinations typically obtain neutral or positive effects on training, employee retention, productivity, innovation, investment, family friendly practices and the use of performance related pay (Addison et al. 2001 , Askildsen et al. 2006 , Bellmann and Ellguth 2006 , Frick and Moeller 2003 , Heywood and Jirjahn 2002 , 2009 , Huebler 2003 , Huebler and Jirjahn 2003 , Jirjahn and Kraft 2010 , Kraft and Lang 2008 , Mueller 2009a , 2009b , Pfeifer 2010 , Smith 2006 , Wagner 2008 , Zwick 2004 ). However, most of the econometric studies treat works councils as a single type of organization by using a simple dummy variable for the presence of a council. In contrast, case studies confirm that councils are in practice heterogeneous (Frege 2002) .
There is a range of industrial relations regimes characterized by different interactions of works council and management. In some establishments councils have extremely adversarial relationships with management. In other establishments councils play an important role in building cooperative employer-employee relations. While case studies indicate that using a simple dummy variable for the presence of a council may result in misleading estimates, they provide no systematic analysis of the circumstances under which adversarial or cooperative relations between council and management result.
This article provides such systematic analysis. We examine the role of learning in the functioning of works councils. 1 The dynamic dimension of codetermination has been almost completely neglected in the economic literature on works councils. Both theoretical and empirical analyses implicitly assume that a council instantaneously lives up to its potential once it has been created. In contrast, we hypothesize that learning implies a change in the nature and scope of codetermination over time. Even though information rights of works councils help reducing information asymmetries between employer and employees, this does not mean that problems of asymmetric information instantaneously and completely disappear. Particularly a newly created council may face information problems. In order to elicit credible information from the employer, the inexperienced council is more likely to use its codetermination rights for conflictual negotiations with management. As time goes by, learning enables worker representatives to develop the ability to understand production processes and economic issues in more detail. As an experienced council can more easily verify the information provided by management, conflictual negotiations diminish. Furthermore, to the extent the council improves its competence the influence on decisions is growing. Finally, as experienced worker representatives have a better understanding of the economic situation of the establishment, the employer"s incentive to opportunistically manipulate information provided to the employees is reduced. This in turn stimulates workers" effort and cooperativeness. Altogether, codetermination provides a procedural framework fostering learning and trust building. Hence, the positive effect of works councils on cooperative industrial relations and establishment performance should grow over time. However, we also discuss the role of a possible codetermination life cycle. Experiences are typically accumulated within organizational routines. Those routines guide further learning and may contribute to increased inertia and obsolescence. This would imply that the age of the works council may have an inversely U-shaped effect on cooperation and establishment performance.
Using unique data from small-and medium-sized establishments in Germany, our empirical analysis yields four key results. First, the probability of an adversarial relationship between management and council is decreasing in the age of the council.
Second, the council"s age is positively associated with the probability that the council has an influence even on decisions where it has no legal powers. Third, the establishment"s output is increasing in the age of the council. Fourth, the quit rate is decreasing in the age of the council. These results provide striking evidence that learning indeed plays a role in the functioning of codetermination. However, our analysis also provides some evidence of a codetermination life cycle. After about thirty years the council"s influence on decisions and its effect on output decrease to some extent. The probability of an adversarial relationship with management increases.
While the dynamic dimension of codetermination has been completely ignored in previous econometric studies on works councils, our analysis is related to a small number of international studies examining the dynamic effects of HRM practices. Evidence from Japan (Kato 2006 ) and the US (Freeman and Kleiner 2000) suggests that the scope of employee involvement programs expands as time goes by. Moreover, studies for Denmark (Eriksson 2003) , Japan (Kato and Morishima 2002) and the US (Helper 1998) show that it takes time for participatory HRM practices to fully deliver higher performance effects. Similarly, Jones and Kato (1995) find that it takes time for the productivity payoff of employee stock-ownership plans in Japanese firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the institutional framework is sketched. Section 3 presents our theoretical background discussion. Section 4 describes the data and variables. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Framework
Industrial relations in Germany are characterized by a dual structure of employee representation with both unions and works councils. While unions negotiate over wage rates and general aspects of employment contracts, works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for establishment-level participation. Collective contracts are typically negotiated between unions and employers" associations on an industrial level. 
Theoretical Background

Solving Employers' Commitment Problems by Codetermination
The existence of commitment problems is one explanation as to why work councils may play the intended role in fostering cooperative and trustful industrial relations within establishments. There is a variety of situations in which commitment problems of employers can arise. For example, employers can behave opportunistically with respect to the use of information. They may conceal health and safety problems from the workers or may pretend that the economic situation of the firm requires increased worker effort.
Moreover, employers may use information obtained from the workers against workers" interest. They may use this information for organizational or technological change which entails job loss or intensification of work load.
If commitment problems are not solved, inefficiencies within the establishment will result. Employees anticipating employer opportunism are very likely to withhold effort and cooperation. If information about potentially performance-enhancing innovations is in the hands of employees, they may not wish to reveal it for the fear that the employer might use the information to their disadvantage. Furthermore, information asymmetries can cause workers to refuse concessions even when those concessions may be necessary to overcome a crisis of the establishment. If employees do not share the same economic information possessed by management, they may fear that the employer overstates the crisis to demand greater concessions. On the employer"s side, low effort and cooperativeness of the workforce imply among others lower productivity and lower innovativeness. On the employees" side, low effort and cooperativeness imply that workers forego the opportunity of higher wages and better working conditions.
Theoretical analyses suggest that worker representation is one way to protect the interests of the workforce and to foster workers" effort and cooperation (Askildsen et al. 2006 , Blair 1999 , Freeman and Lazear 1995 , Furubotn and Wiggins 1984 , Hogan 2001 , Kaufman and Levine 2000 , Malcomson 1983 , Osterloh and Frey 2006 , Smith 1991 .
Providing a works council with information rights helps reducing information asymmetries. This makes it easier to verify the employer"s claims. Moreover, providing the council with veto and coequal participation rights helps avoiding that the employer unilaterally takes actions without considering workers" interests. The council"s role in building trustful employer-employee relations is also strengthened by the legal requirement to cooperate with management. Altogether, the institutional design of works councils suggests that they have the potential to realize mutual gains for employers and employees by solving commitment problems. 3 Works councils can potentially contribute to increased efficiency by negotiating for performance-enhancing practices that otherwise would not have been possible. Mueller-Jentsch (1995, p. 55) goes so far as to contend that codetermination rights have required that councils act as co-managers and "take responsibility for productivity and economic success".
The Role of Learning
However, from a theoretical point of view, there is no mechanical relationship between codetermination and cooperative employer-employee relations. However, the WCA provides the works council also with codetermination rights.
These codetermination rights strengthen workers" bargaining power and imply increased scope for negotiations between workforce and management that otherwise would not have been possible. The crucial point is that negotiations can be seen as a learning process (Cross 1977) . Thus, both the increased bargaining power and the increased scope for negotiations offer the opportunity for learning. Recent bargaining models show that conflict plays an important role in such learning processes (Cramton and Tracy 2003, Kennan and Wilson 1993) . This insight can be applied to codetermination. Works councils can use their codetermination rights to elicit credible information from the employers by delaying decisions. For example, the council may demand extensive consultations when the employer contends that ensuring the establishment"s competitiveness requires higher effort of the workforce. The employer is likely to only enter cumbersome negotiations with the works council and to spend a lot of time in meetings when there is really a need for workers" concessions. Hence, the managers" willingness to enter conflictual negotiations serves as a signal of their credibility. Conflict as a method to elicit credible information is particularly important when there are substantial information asymmetries between the employer and the works council. This is more likely to hold true in case of a newly created works council. In that case, worker representatives have little experience and face difficulties in verifying the employer"s claims. Hence, they are more likely to rely on conflict in order to ensure that the employer conveys credible information.
This may be reinforced by a further factor. Works councils as an institution to protect workers" quasi-rents are more likely to be introduced by the workforce in situations where establishments face a crisis or undergo substantial restructuring (Jirjahn 2009 , Jirjahn 2010 , Kraft and Lang 2008 , Mohrenweiser et al. 2009 ). In those situations, employers are more likely to break implicit contracts and to renege on the promises made to the employees (Bertrand 2004 , Idson and Valetta 1996 , Valetta 1999 . While councils may help rebuilding trust in those situations, this is not very likely to occur without conflicts. As workers" interests are substantially affected, newly created councils facing information asymmetries will rely on conflictual negotiations to obtain more information on the details of the crisis or the restructuring process.
However, codetermination may change in its nature and scope as time goes by.
Codetermination involves learning by doing. During consultation and negotiation with management, the works council elicits valuable information. This allows accumulating long-term relevant experience. Moreover, participation in training courses can help works councillors to improve their competencies. Altogether, training and learning by doing enable worker representatives to develop over time the ability to understand the production process, the organizational framework and the economic situation of the establishment in more detail. This implies that information asymmetries between management and works council diminish. As the works council can more easily verify new information provided by management, conflictual negotiations are less likely to occur over time. For example, an experienced works council may be able to make its own predictions about the future economic situation of the establishment. This allows the council a better assessment of the credibility of the employer"s predictions even without conflictual bargaining. Diminishing conflicts imply that less time is lost due to delays in decision making.
Of course, the learning process entailed by codetermination is not one-sided. The employer will also change his attitudes and behavior as time goes by. Because the works council is initially inexperienced, the employer may have a higher incentive to behave opportunistically with respect to a newly created council. The employer"s incentive to strategically manipulate information is reduced if he learns that an experienced works council can more easily verify his claims. Or put it differently, to the extent the council gains competence and experience, the probability of employer opportunism diminishes over time. Instead of strategic manipulation and adversarial bargaining, the employer is more likely to rely on building trust and cooperation with the works council. This in turn implies that workers" effort and cooperativeness increase.
Similarly, Lorenz (1999) argues that the WCA provides a procedural framework fostering mutual learning and reciprocal trust building. Employer and employees do not only learn about the surrounding environment but also about each other. Specifically each partner can form better judgements about the trustworthiness of the other partner based on the success of their past cooperation. This learning process may follow a "step-bystep" rule. Employer and works council start by making small commitments to each other and then increase their commitments depending on the quality of their interactions. This implies that the positive effect of establishment-level codetermination on employeremployee cooperation and establishment performance should grow over time.
Relatedly, mutual learning entails an increasing influence of the works council.
While an inexperienced council is likely to rely on conflictual negotiations to obtain credible information, its influence on decision may be limited in the end. As a newly created works council lacks experience and know how, it may face difficulties in providing own solutions that contribute to increased performance and reconcile the conflicting interests of the employer and the employees. Moreover, if management fears that an inexperienced works council may harm the quality of decisions, it will try to isolate or ignore the council. However, to the extent the council accumulates experience over time, it can come up with own valuable ideas and advice to management. If management recognizes that a competent works council can contribute to increased establishment performance, it will ask the council to participate in a wide range of decisions. Management learns that a works council is a valuable institution helping to learn more about workers" interests and, hence, to make personnel management more effective. Altogether, accumulated competence and experience implies that the influence of the works council should grow over time. This prediction is supported by Japanese evidence showing that well-trained and competent worker representatives have a greater influence on decisions within firms (Kato 2003 , Kato and Morishima 2002 .
In summary, our theoretical considerations suggest that the consultations and negotiations entailed by codetermination provide the framework for a unique multifaceted learning process. Training and learning by doing enable the council to appreciate the production process, the organizational framework and the economic situation of the establishment in more detail. This helps to reduce information asymmetries between management and council to a larger extent. Moreover, management learns that the works council is a valuable partner helping to learn more about workers" interest and the local conditions in the establishment. Finally, both sides learn about each other"s trustworthiness and how to cooperate with each other. This learning process has important implications. While codetermination initially may involve increased conflicts, adversarial negotiations between management and works council will diminish in the course of time. Moreover, the influence of the works council on decisions and its positive effect on establishment performance should increase over time. Of course, learning is no guarantee that cooperative and trustful industrial relations within establishments are always achieved. The crucial point is that learning should make those relations more likely. Clearly other factors may have an independent effect on intra-establishment industrial relations as well. Thus, in order to isolate the dynamic effect of establishmentlevel codetermination in our empirical examination, it is important to control for other influences such as unions, workforce structure and establishment size.
A Possible Codetermination Life Cycle
We will also examine the role of a possible codetermination life cycle. Building on theories of organizational learning (Crossan et al. 1999 , Levitt and March 1988 , Sorensen and Stuart 2000 , it can be argued that routines play an important role in the learning 
Data and Variables
The Data Set
We use data from the IfM Bonn Works Council Survey conducted by the Small and Medium Size Enterprise Research Institute (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung -IfM).
The survey provides a unique cross-sectional data set of small-and medium-sized establishments in Germany (Schloemer et al. 2007) . highly incomplete. Even though the data set to some extent allows calculating the age of works councils introduced after 1993, this is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, as the question on the presence of a works council is not asked regularly in every wave, it is not possible to calculate the age of every council that has been newly created. Second, given the relatively short time span of the IAB Establishment Panel one could only examine rather young works councils. Our analysis shows that it is very important to also consider older councils. In our data the oldest works council has been created more than 50 years ago. Third, the introduction of a works council is a relatively rare event. The overwhelming majority of establishments do not change their works council status.
Hence, focusing on rather young works councils implies that we would only have a handful of observations for the analysis. We measure the establishment"s output by the log of productivity with productivity being defined as sales per employee. The relationship between worker representation and personnel turnover has also been of great interest (e.g., Addison et al. 2001 , Freeman 1980 , Frick 1996 , Frick and Moeller 2003 , Pfeifer 2010 . We use the rate of quits by workers as an inverse indicator of performance. A low quit rate indicates high job satisfaction and an increased willingness of the employees to provide effort and to invest in their firm-specific human capital.
Dependent Variables
Age of the Works Council
The definitions of the explanatory variables and their descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 . Most importantly, the survey asks the year in which the works council has been introduced by the workforce. Hence, we can calculate the age of the council. The average age in the sample is 19 years. The age of the works council is our explanatory variable of primary interest. Our theoretical considerations imply that the age of the works council should be negatively associated with personnel turnover and the probability of bad relations between council and management. It should be positively associated with the council"s influence on decisions and establishment output. In order to investigate the role of a possible codetermination life cycle, we also include the squared age.
The theory outlined in Section 3 strongly suggests that age is closely related to learning. This is in line with the literature on organizational learning. As learning is a dynamic process occurring over time, this literature routinely emphasizes that age plays a key role in the organizational learning process (Bahk and Gort 1993 , Bell et al. 2002 , Crossan et al. 1999 , Ranger-Moore 1997 , Pil and MacDuffie 1996 , Sorensen and Stuart 2000 , Thornhill and Amit 2003 . Of course, the learning process associated with the aging of the council is not necessarily the same across all types of establishments. It may depend on specific circumstances such as technology or management strategy.
Examining the interaction of age with those circumstances requires panel data. Panel data would allow not only observing the various circumstances at the beginning (when the council was created), but also taking into account their development over time. While our data set is unique in that it provides information on the age of the works council, a potential limitation might be its cross-sectional nature. Hence, we must leave the role of moderating influences as an important topic for future research. Nonetheless our findings provide valuable insights as the estimated effects of the age of the works council can be interpreted as average effects across the various circumstances.
Control Variables
The data provide a rich set of control variables. While our four dependent variables may be influenced by different sets of determinants, we will use almost the same specifications for the estimates. This allows testing if the sets indeed differ. In what follows we develop hypotheses on the determinants. Furthermore, the structure of the workforce is accounted for by variables for the proportion of university graduates, skilled white-collar employees, skilled blue-collar employees, part-time employees, and women. 5 The qualification of the workforce should have a positive effect on the establishment"s productivity. Moreover, high shares of qualified workers should be associated with reduced personnel fluctuation as establishments typically use internal labor markets to bind highly qualified employees.
The workforce is also very likely to play a role in the quality of industrial relations.
Specifically, the works council"s influence on decisions should depend on the support the council receives by the employees. Thus, we include two dummy variables for a strong support or modest support provided by the workforce. The reference group is composed of establishments where the workforce does not support the works council.
We also take into account that works councils are part of a broader industrial relations system that also involves employee representation through unions. Although Management is very likely to have a fair share in the outcomes. We include two dummy variables for the presence of active owners to capture the managerial environment. First, an indicator for establishments managed by its founders is included.
Second, we include a variable for establishments managed by active owners who are not the founders. The reference group is composed of establishments where no active owners are present. Theoretical models (Feinberg 1980 , Olson 1977 , Singell and Thornton 1997 and empirical findings (Benz and Frey 2004) suggest that active owners gain utility from being the ultimate bosses. Active ownership can be seen as a nonpecuniary good that can only be obtained from within the firm. As codetermination limits their discretionary power, active owners are more likely to restrict the council"s influence. 7 This might even entail a positive view toward the works council if the autocratic style of leadership involves a quiet life for the active owners. Active ownership should also have an effect on establishment performance. On the one hand, it may imply reduced agency problems.
On the other, it may imply that owners forego the opportunity to implement a high-ability management (Bennedsen et al. 2007 ). Moreover, the theory of strategic delegation suggests that the separation of ownership and control has a competitive advantage for the profit-maximizing owners of the firm (Fershtman 1985) . Owners can commit to a more aggressive strategy by delegating output decisions to managers who maximize an objective function that compromises between profit and sales maximization. This helps discouraging competitors. Or put differently, active ownership involves a disadvantage as it implies a less credible threat to deter competitors.
For two reasons, we include a dummy for the use of direct forms of worker involvement in decision making. First, there is an ongoing debate on the cost and the performance effect of participatory HRM practices (e.g., Boning et al. 2007 , Capelli and Neumark 2001 , Freeman and Kleiner 2000 , Heywood et al. 2008 . Second, forms of direct employee involvement are often viewed as substitutes for works councils. If this holds true, direct employee involvement should undermine the council"s influence on management decisions. However, from a theoretical view point direct employee involvement and worker representation may be rather complementary. Direct employee involvement does not necessarily solve commitment problems (Baker et al. 1999) . While managers may ex ante promise to delegate authority, they may ex post be tempted to overrule employees" decisions. A works council can ensure that promises made are kept.
Furthermore, a dummy for establishments located in East Germany is included.
This allows testing if the quality of industrial relations and the performance of establishments still differ between East and West Germany (Burda and Hunt 2001 , Frege 1998 , Hyman 1996 . Five industry dummies account for variations in the nature of what is being produced. Finally, a dummy for positive employment growth in the last two years is included as a potential determinant of intra-establishment industrial relations.
While a council may be particularly important for rebuilding trust in establishments with declining employment (Jirjahn 2009 (Jirjahn , 2010 , this is not very likely to occur without cumbersome negotiations. Or put it differently, employment growth should be associated with a lower probability of a bad relationship between council and management. Table 3 provides estimates of the determinants of intra-establishment industrial relations.
Empirical Results
Intra-Establishment Industrial Relations
As both dependent variables are dichotomous, the determinants were estimated with the probit procedure. Many of the control variables take statistically significant coefficients of the expected sign. Establishment size is negatively associated with a strong influence of the works council. As larger establishments are more bureaucratic organizations, opportunities to influence decisions may be more limited in those establishments.
Moreover, the estimates confirm that the quality of industrial relations depends on the support the works council receives by the workforce. Support by the workforce is significantly associated with a lower probability of a bad relation between council and management and a higher probability that the council has a strong influence on decisions.
Or put it slightly differently, if the employees keep the council grounded, this increases both the council"s influence and the cooperation between council and management.
Further, the share of skilled white-collar workers is a statistically significant determinant of a bad relationship between council and management. Skilled white-collar workers are often thought to be more individualistic, having a stronger focus on their personal career.
Hence, a high share of skilled white-collar workers indicates a heterogeneous workforce resulting in cumbersome negotiations between council and management. Managers in establishments with positive employment growth during the last two years are less likely to report a bad relationship with the works council. This suggests that there is less potential for conflicts in prospering establishments. Interestingly, the variable for direct worker involvement in decision making does not emerge as a statistically significant determinant. The dummy variable for East German establishments is also no significant covariate. This may support the view that the functioning of codetermination in East Germany is developing in a similar way to that in West Germany.
Turning to the explanatory variable of primary interest, the age of the works council is significantly associated with both indicators of the quality of intraestablishment industrial relations. In the regression on a bad relationship between council and management, the coefficient on the linear term is significantly negative while the coefficient on the squared term is significantly positive. The size of the estimated coefficients implies that the probability of a bad relationship is decreasing in the age of the works council up to 27 years. This supports the view that learning plays a crucial role in the functioning of establishment-level codetermination. Cooperation between works
council and management appears to be increasing for a remarkably long time. However, afterwards the probability of a bad relationship is increasing in the age of the works council. This can be seen as evidence of a participation life cycle.
In the regression on the influence of the council, the coefficient on the linear age variable is significantly positive while the coefficient on the squared term is significantly negative. The size of the estimated coefficients implies that the probability of a strong influence is increasing in the age of the works councils up to 32 years. This provides further support for the hypothesis that the dynamic dimension of codetermination plays an important role. The council"s influence on decisions appears to be increasing for a very long time. However, afterwards it is decreasing. Hence, also this regression provides evidence of a participation life cycle.
Altogether, for about 30 years both the probability of a cooperative relationship with management and the probability of a strong influence on decisions are increasing in the age of the works council. This indicates that a remarkable learning process is at work.
An impression of the magnitude of the effect can be obtained by using the estimated coefficients to project the probabilities of a strong influence and of a bad relationship. Table 4 shows the projections for different ages of the works council. All of the control variables are assumed to be at their mean level. The projections confirm that the effect of the council"s age is not only statistically significant but also economically significant.
Initially, the probability of a strong influence of the council is about 16 percent. It increases roughly by two fifth within the first ten years. After thirty years this probability is almost 50 percent. The initial probability of a bad relationship with management is about 5 percent. This probability decreases roughly by two third within the first ten years.
After thirty years it is only half a percent.
Establishment Performance
So far we have examined the effect on subjectively assessed quality of industrial relations. We now use objective indicators of establishment performance to study the role of the council"s age. The results are shown in Table 5 . 8 Column (1) provides OLS estimates of the determinants of the log of productivity. Establishments in East Germany appear to be less productive than establishments in West Germany. Establishment size and a high share of university graduates are positive covariates of productivity. The share of female employees is a negative covariate. Interestingly, both variables for active owners are significantly negative determinants. This confirms the notion that active owners forego the opportunity to implement a high-ability management. Furthermore, the estimates show that support by unions is positively associated with productivity. This is consistent with the view that a strong works council is more effective in increasing establishment performance. However, moderate support by unions has the highest effect.
Returning to our main theme, the estimates show that the dynamic dimension of codetermination plays also a statistically significant role in the establishment"s productivity. The linear age variable emerges with a positive coefficient while the squared term takes a negative coefficient. This implies that the council"s age has an inversely U-shaped influence on establishment output. The establishment"s productivity is increasing in the council"s age up to 35 years, after which it starts to fall. Hence, also this objective measure of establishment performance provides evidence of both the importance of a long-term learning process and the role of a codetermination life cycle.
The projections shown in column (1) of Table 6 confirm that the influence of the dynamic dimension of codetermination is also economically significant. On average initial productivity is about 109000 Euros. After a works council has been created, sales increase by roughly one quarter within the first ten years. Compared to the initial level, a thirty years old council is associated with an increase in productivity by about one half.
Column (2) of Table 5 provides estimates of the determinants of the quit rate. The determinants were estimated with the tobit procedure. Collective bargaining coverage emerges as a negative covariate. Further, the share of university graduates and the share of skilled blue-collar workers are associated with a lower quit rate. This confirms that internal labor markets are specifically used to provide long-term employment relationships for qualified employees. The proportion of female employees is positively associated with the quit rate. This reflects the lower labor force attachment of women.
The age of the works council is a negative determinant of the quit rate. Thus, also this regression provides evidence of the dynamic dimension of codetermination. An experienced works council may be more helpful in implementing an effective personnel management. This in turn results in increased job satisfaction and reduced fluctuation.
The squared age variable does not emerge as a statistically significant covariate of the quit rate. Hence, this regression fails to provide evidence of a codetermination life cycle.
The estimated coefficients can be used to project the quit rate. Column (2) of Table 6 shows the projections on the quit rate for different ages of the works council. The control variables are again assumed to be at their mean level. Moreover, as the coefficient on the squared age variable is statistically insignificant, the squared age is also assumed to be at its mean level. After a council has been implemented, the quit rate decreases by roughly one tenth within the first ten years. A thirty years old works council is associated with a decrease in the quit rate by almost two fifth. 
Age of the Works Council vs. Age of the Establishment
The age of the works council and the age of the establishment are positively correlated. In our data the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.67. To ensure that our results really capture the age of the council and not simply the age of the establishment, we reestimated all regressions by adding establishment age as a further explanatory variable. Table 3 , it can be seen that that the estimated relationships between the age of the works council and the quality of industrial relations in general remain robust. Only in regression (1b), the coefficient on the linear variable for the age of the council loses statistical significance.
However, with a value of 1.42 the T-statistic is still relatively high. Moreover, neither establishment age nor its square plays a significant role in any of the regressions. Thus, our robustness checks provide no evidence that the age of the works council simply reflects the age of the establishment. Table 5 , it can be seen that the estimated effects of the council"s age on productivity and quits in general also remain robust. Only in regression (1b) the coefficient on the squared age of the council loses statistical significance. On the one hand, this might cast some doubt on the codetermination life cycle. On the other, there is still a relatively high T-value of 1.53. Moreover, neither establishment age nor its square does emerge with a significant coefficient in any of the regressions. Hence, we remain confident that our findings indeed capture the effects of the council"s age.
Conclusions
While there is a remarkably increasing number of econometric studies on German works councils, those studies are essentially silent on the role of learning. This article provides evidence that the dynamic dimension of codetermination plays an important role in the council"s influence on decisions, in the relationship between council and management, and in the council"s influence on establishment performance. The quality of industrial relations, the influence on decisions and the performance-enhancing effect of codetermination are increasing in the age of the works council for a remarkably long period of time. However, our estimates also provide some evidence of a codetermination life cycle. After about thirty years the quality of the relationship with management, the influence on decisions and the effect on establishment performance decrease to some extent.
Our results show the functioning of establishment-level codetermination in N 241 241 Robust T-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. The probabilities of a bad relation with management are projected using the estimated coefficients in column (1) of in Table 3 . The probabilities of a strong influence are projected using the estimated coefficients in column (2) of Table 3 . All of the other control variables are assumed to be at their mean level. N 222 236 Robust T-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. Sales are projected using the estimated coefficients in column (1) of in Table 5 . The quit rates are projected using the estimated coefficients in column (2) of Table 5 . All of the other control variables are assumed to be at their mean level. Robust T-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. Note that all of the other control variables listed in Table 3 are included but are suppressed to save space. Robust T-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. Note that all of the other control variables listed in Table 5 are included but are suppressed to save space.
